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CaseNo.20090597-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Brian William Poundstone, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction on a guilty plea for aggravated 
kidnaping, a first-degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. A. Did the trial court have any duty to inquire into Defendant's 
competency where the record is devoid of any suggestion of a substantial question 
of possible doubt as to his competency? 
Standard of Review. Defendant did not preserve this claim below and argues 
both plain error and exceptional circumstances. To establish plain error, a 
defendant must show that "'(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful[.]" See State v. Shaffer, 2010 
UT App 240, If 10, 239 P.3d 285 (quoting State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,116,122 P.3d 
543) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Exceptional 
circumstances exist only for the most unusual circumstances where the failure to 
consider an unpreserved issue would result in manifest injustice. See State v. 
Munguia, 2011 UT 5, If If 11,22, P.3d . 
B. Did Defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance when she 
decided to forego a competency petition? 
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f^ 6, 89 
P.3d 162. 
2. Did the trial court violate rule 11(e) in taking Defendant's guilty plea? 
Standard of Review. Whether a trial court has strictly complied with rule 11 in 
taking a guilty plea presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 10, 983 P.2d 556. The "trial court's underlying factual 
findings are reviewed for clear error." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, | 9,22 P.3d 1242 
(citation omitted). However, no standard of review applies to this issue because it 
was not preserved below, Defendant argues no exception to the preservation 
requirement, and any error was invited by Defendant's trial counsel. 
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3. A. Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea where the record shows that Defendant knew the maximum possible 
sentence prior to entering his plea, and the court strictly complied with rule 11? 
Standard of Review. This Court "review[s] a trial court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard/' State v. Holland, 921 
P.2d 430,433 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Lovell, 
2010 UT 48, \ 5, P.3d . Findings of fact supporting the court's ruling are 
reviewed for clear error. See Lovell, 2010 UT 48, % 5. 
B. Did Defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance by failing to 
pursue a ruling on the alleged rule 11(e) violations? 
Standard of Review. " An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law." Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following rules are largely determinative of the issues addressed herein 
and are attached in Addendum A: 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, a first-degree felony, 
and aggravated assault, a third-degree felony. R. 2-3. At a status conference on 
March 13, 2008, his appointed counsel asked for and received four weeks to file a 
request for a competency evaluation of Defendant and to review discovery. R. 11; R. 
176:6. A month later, when the judge asked for the status of the competency 
evaluation, defense counsel informed him that she had "made a decision not to file 
the request for a competency evaluation" because Defendant was "fully cognizant of 
. . . ." R. 176:8. Counsel did not finish her explanation because the trial judge 
interrupted and moved on to a discussion of the need for a preliminary hearing. Id. 
Defendant waived a preliminary hearing, and the court bound him over as charged. 
R. 18-19; R. 176:8. 
The parties undertook negotiations, but ultimately required a trial setting. R. 
24,29,34; R. 176:8-11. When they appeared for trial, defense counsel informed the 
court that a plea agreement had been reached under which Defendant would plead 
guilty to aggravated kidnapping and the State would seek dismissal of the 
remaining charge. R. 176:14; R. 80-81. The court undertook a colloquy with 
Defendant in which he established that Defendant knew that the plea was not 
required, that he had a right to a jury trial, and that he had a right to have his 
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attorney confront and cross-examine witnesses. R. 176:14 (a copy of the plea 
colloquy is attached in Addendum B). He informed Defendant of his right to be 
acquitted absent presentation by the State of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 
176:14-15. He also verified that Defendant had gone over the plea affidavit, read 
and understood it, was aware that it contained all the rights he would give up by 
entering the plea, and that the affidavit would forever signify his waiver of his 
rights. R. 176:15 (a copy of the plea affidavit is attached in Addendum C). Defense 
counsel stated the factual basis for the plea and noted that, although Defendant did 
not agree with the facts, he agreed that not only would the State present those facts 
at trial, but there was "a substantial risk of conviction" on those facts. R. 176:15-17. 
Both the court and counsel articulated that the crime carried a potential sentence of 
six, ten or fifteen years to life in prison, and the court noted that prison was 
mandatory. R. 176:17. When asked, Defendant said he had no questions, executed 
the plea affidavit in open court, and entered his guilty plea. Id. The court accepted 
the plea and dismissed count two pursuant to the plea agreement. R. 80; R. 176:17. 
The judge ordered preparation of a presentence report and set sentencing.l R. 80; R. 
176:17-18. 
1
 No presentence report is contained in the appellate record. 
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Four days after entry of the plea, the court received a pro se letter from 
Defendant seeking to withdraw his plea. R. 95. Defendant claimed that the facts on 
which the plea was based were "not the real ones'7 and stated that he wanted to take 
the case to trial or negotiate "some other kind of agreement." Id. Thereafter, his 
counsel filed a formal motion to withdraw the plea, arguing that withdrawal was 
warranted because the court had failed to strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, in taking the plea. R. 113-18 (a copy is attached in Addendum 
D). When the matter was argued on November 3,2008, defense counsel conceded 
that the trial judge "did a really good job on [the] colloquy" and "asked every 
question that needed to be asked." R. 176:31 (a transcript of the argument is 
attached in Addendum E). She focused instead on her belief that Defendant did not 
understand that the sentence included the possibility of a maximum life term. R. 
176:31-32. Following argument, the trial court denied the motion and sentenced 
Defendant to the recommended term of six-years-to-life in the State Prison. R. 122, 
128; R. 176:32-33,37. Defendant's appointed counsel was permitted to withdraw 
two months later. R. 132. 
Defendant filed an untimely pro se notice of appeal in June 2009. R. 133-34; R. 
176:39. At Defendant's request, this Court remanded the case for a determination of 
indigency and, if necessary, appointment of counsel. R. 138; R. 176:39-40. The trial 
6 
court appointed counsel, who sought to perfect Defendant's direct appeal. R. 145-
48,161-63; R. 176:40-41,44-46. The trial court ultimately reinstated the period for 
filing an appeal without opposition from the prosecutor, and Defendant ultimately 
filed a second amended notice of appeal. R. 165,170-75; R. 176:45-46. The Utah 
Supreme Court subsequently poured the appeal over to this Court. See Appellate 
Docket. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant waived a preliminary hearing and entered a guilty plea shortly 
thereafter. No presentence investigation report appears in the appellate record. 
Consequently, the only facts presently before this Court are those underlying the 
guilty plea, which Defendant agrees are the facts the State would present if the case 
went to trial. R. 107; R. 176:15-16. 
Those facts are that on February 2,2008, Defendant grabbed A.M., a juvenile, 
in a headlock and pulled her into a room at an LDS church in Roosevelt. R. 107; R. 
176-15-16. Closing the door behind them, he put his knife against A.M/s neck and 
told her that if she stayed calm and did not move or say anything, she would not get 
hurt. Id. He did so with the intent to inflict bodily injury on A.M. or to terrorize 
her. R. 107. When an adult came into the room shortly thereafter, Defendant hid 
the knife. R. 176:16. A.M. told the adult she needed to talk to her, and Defendant 
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fled. Id. He was followed by a member of the church and was arrested later the 
same day. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte 
inquire into his competency or to set a competency hearing, despite the absence of a 
competency petition. Because the claim is unpreserved, he argues plain error, 
exceptional circumstances, and ineffective assistance. To prevail, Defendant must 
establish that there existed below a substantial question of doubt as to his 
competency. Each of his arguments fail because the record makes no reference to 
any of the information on which he relies to meet this burden. Similarly, the record 
is inadequate to support his claim that the information was known either to the trial 
court or to Defendant's trial counsel. 
Point II. Defendant challenges the trial court's taking of his guilty plea. 
However, he failed to object below to the incorporation of the plea affidavit or to the 
trial court's discussion during the plea colloquy of a majority of the rights outlined 
in rule 11(e). His failure to argue any exception to the preservation rule permits 
rejection of his unpreserved arguments on appeal. 
In any event, his trial counsel invited any error when, after presenting a rule 
11 challenge in her written motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty plea, she 
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conceded at argument that the court's plea colloquy included "every question that 
needed to be asked" and represented that the "basis" for the withdrawal motion 
was, instead, Defendant's alleged misunderstanding as to sentencing. 
Finally, Defendant's challenge fails on its merits where the record 
demonstrates that the trial court properly incorporated the plea affidavit, and used 
it in conjunction with the plea colloquy to address each of the matters challenged by 
Defendant. 
Point III. Defendant claims error in the trial court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that Defendant 
knew of the potential maximum sentence for the crime to which he pled guilty. 
Defendant argues that the record does not demonstrate that he was advised "in 
court" of the maximum possible sentence for aggravated kidnapping. However, the 
record amply demonstrates that Defendant was informed of the fact outside the 
courtroom prior to entering his plea. Moreover, the plea affidavit twice references 
the maximum possible sentence, and both defense counsel and the trial court 
articulated the information during the plea colloquy. 
Defendant also claims error in the trial court's failure to reach his challenges 
to the plea colloquy and ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel's 
failure to pursue the claims below. The former argument fails for each of the 
9 
reasons set forth in Point II. His ineffective assistance claim fails because assertion 
of the rule 11 claims by his trial counsel would have been futile in the absence of any 
such error below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE RECORD SUPPORT 
FOR HIS CHALLENGE TO THE ABSENCE OF A COMPETENCY 
EVALUATION DEFEATS HIS CLAIMS OF PLAIN ERROR AND 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error when, after 
defense counsel decided not to seek a competency evaluation, the court did not 
require counsel to justify her decision and did not sua sponte either question 
Defendant on his competency or set a competency hearing. See Aplt. Br. at 34-37. 
He argues that his counsel's request for time to file a competency petition, together 
with the "additional information7' known to the court about Defendant's 
background and behavioral problems, created a substantial question of doubt as to 
his competency which required the court to act sua sponte to resolve the competency 
issue. See id. at 36-37. He also contends that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance when she decided not to pursue a competency evaluation in the face of 
his "substantial mental health issues[.]" Id. at 48-51. 
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This Court should reject Defendant's claim because he fails to establish that 
anything in the record or at the plea hearing created a substantial question of 
possible doubt about his competency. Accordingly, he cannot demonstrate that the 
trial court plainly erred or that his counsel was ineffective on this point.2 
A. The Record is Inadequate to Establish Either Plain Error or 
Exceptional Circumstances 
Defendant admits that he did not preserve his claim below and argues that it 
should be reviewed under the plain error or exceptional circumstances exceptions to 
the preservation rule. See Aplt. Br. at 37. 
This Court reaches unpreserved issues under the exceptional circumstances 
doctrine only in cases involving "rare procedural anomalies/' State v. Munguia, 2011 
UT 5, | | 11, 22, P.3d (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the 
2
 Defendant's argument relies in part on a newspaper article he includes in 
Addendum K of his brief. See Aplt. Br. at 35 & Add. K. That article is not properly 
before this Court inasmuch as it was not made part of the record below, and 
Defendant did not supplement the record with the article pursuant to rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Law, 2003 UT App 228, | 2, 75 P.3d 923 
("An appellate court's 'review is ... limited to the evidence contained in the record 
on appeal'" . . . and the record may not be supplemented with additional material 
"by simply including the omitted material in the party's addendum.") (quoting State 
v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, | 7,974 P.2d 279 (citation omitted)). In any event, the article is 
irrelevant as it provides no information not otherwise included in the appellate 
record. 
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exception is reserved only for the most unusual circumstances where the failure to 
consider an unpreserved issue would result in manifest injustice. See id. 
To establish plain error, a defendant must show that "'(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful[.]" 
See State v. Shaffer, 2010 UT App 240, f 10,239 P.3d 285 (quoting State v. Cruz, 2005 
UT 45, f 16,122 P.3d 543) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Defendant establishes neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances in the 
trial court's failure to sua sponte question his competency. His argument assumes, 
without supporting authority, that the trial court had a duty to inquire about 
defense counsel's change of position on the issue of competency or to question 
Defendant about the matter. Without identifying any source for such responsibility, 
Defendant cannot establish plain error in the trial court's alleged breach of that 
responsibility. See State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App 50, | 7, 228 P.3d 1255 (requiring the 
existence settled appellate law to guide the trial court at the time of the alleged error 
before the error will be deemed to be obvious). 
Moreover, the trial court had no duty to sua sponte schedule a competency 
hearing under the facts of this case. Absent the filing of a petition, a trial court is 
required to set a competency hearing only "when there is "a substantial question of 
12 
possible doubt as to a defendant's competency at the time of the guilty plea/" State 
v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 49, 63 P.3d 731 (citation omitted); see also Jacobs v. State, 
2001 UT 17, | 13, 20 P.3d 382. To determine whether a trial court erred by not 
holding a competency hearing, "a reviewing court considers the facts that were 
before the trial court when the plea was entered/7 See Jacob, 2001 UT 17, f 8. "The 
fact that a person is mentally ill, displays bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior, or 
has a history of mental illness, does not mean that he or she is incompetent to stand 
trial/7 Id. at If 16. 
In this case, the record reflects nothing leading up to the entry of Defendant's 
guilty plea that would raise "'a substantial question of possible doubt777 as to his 
competency. The trial judge knew that defense counsel had considered filing a 
competency petition, then changed her mind, although no reason for counsel's 
actions appears in the record. R. 176:6,8. Defendant had appeared before the judge 
numerous times by then, yet the record reflects nothing unusual about any of his 
appearances. R. I76:passim. At the plea hearing, the judge listened as Defendant 
responded appropriately to questions from the court, affirmed his understanding of 
the written plea agreement, and acknowledged that he was knowingly and 
voluntarily pleading guilty. R. 176:14-18. In addition, Defendant's trial counsel 
signed the certificate attached to the written plea statement attesting to her belief 
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that Defendant had read the statement, fully understood its contents, and was 
"mentally and physically competent/' R. 101. Nothing up to and including the plea 
hearing sheds any additional light on Defendant's competency or raises any 
question, let alone a substantial one, of possible doubt about his competency. 
Defendant contends that a substantial question of law as to his competency 
arose from information provided to his trial counsel and to the prosecutor and later 
communicated to the judge. See Aplt. Br. at 35-37. The information allegedly 
derived from meetings between Defendant and his trial counsel, from Duchesne 
County Jail staff, from a police interview with Defendant's half-brother, and from a 
twenty-two page fax. See id. at 16-20,35-36. The information supposedly detailed 
Defendant's conduct at the county jail where he purportedly exhibited "volatile and 
irrational behavior," masturbated constantly, and relentlessly bragged about his 
Colorado juvenile court record which involved his abuse of his younger step-
brothers. Id. at 18-19,35. The information also included references to Defendant's 
"long established behavior problems[,]" his "documented history of anger and 
depression[,j" and his "lengthy juvenile placement and related problems." Id. at 18-
20,33,35-36. 
Defendant's claim suffers from two insurmountable problems. The first is his 
failure to provide any record support for the information on which he relies. See 
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State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307,309 (Utah 1985) (appellant has the burden of ensuring 
that the record contains the materials, necessary to support his claims on appeal; 
therefore, when an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the 
Court must presume that the missing portions support the action of the district 
court.). The record contains none of the documents identified by Defendant or any 
evidence suggesting that the documents exist. Neither is there any reference in the 
record to any of the specific information identified by Defendant. Even if some of 
the information could be found in a presentence investigation report, no such report 
is included in the appellate record, and it would not have been available to the 
lower court at the time of the plea hearing, rendering its contents irrelevant to this 
Court's review of this claim. See Jacobs, 2001 UT17, f 8 (reviewing only "the facts 
that were before the trial court when the plea was entered"). 
Without a basis in the record to establish the existence of the information on 
which Defendant's claim relies, the claim is entirely speculative and wholly 
insufficient to establish plain error or any exceptional circumstance in the lower 
court's handling of the competency issue. 
The second flaw in Defendant's argument is his inability to establish that such 
information ever reached the trial court. See Aplt. Br. at 35-36. Defense counsel's 
request for an opportunity to file a competency petition made no mention of 
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counsel's reasoning or of the information that prompted the request. R. 176:6. She 
later decided not to file a competency petition, telling the judge she "made a 
decision not to file the request for a competency evaluation[] because Mr. 
Poundstone is fully cognizant of " R. 176:8. Although the judge interrupted her 
and did not return to the issue, counsel's comment demonstrates that she 
considered the matter and affirmatively decided that an evaluation was not 
warranted for a particular reason. Her conduct would reassure the trial court that 
no question remained as to Defendant's competency, let alone a substantial one. No 
other express reference to Defendant's competency appears in the record. 
Defendant argues that the judge was necessarily "apprised of th[e] additional 
information" behind his counsel's initial concern for his competency because when 
the judge took the plea, he asked whether a psychosexual report was needed in this 
case. Apit. Br. at 33,35-36. The record is silent, however, on the reasons behind the 
comment. The question may have been prompted by something other than the 
information identified by Defendant, including the judge's routine when taking a 
guilty plea, information relating solely to Defendant's juvenile criminal history, or 
the fact that Defendant was originally charged in the alternative with intending to 
commit a sexual offense. R. 2-3. In any event, Defendant's claim is purely 
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speculative and does not establish that the judge had any information before it that 
raised a substantial question of law as to Defendant's competency. 
Finally, even if the information alleged by Defendant had been provided to 
the trial court prior to entry of the guilty plea, the judge's failure to inquire into 
Defendant's competence would not have amounted to plain error because the 
information is insufficient to raise a substantial question as to Defendant's 
competency. The information involved Defendant's criminal record, his constant 
masturbation, and his 'Volatile and irrational behavior[.]" Aplt. Br. at 35. Such 
information does not necessarily mean that Defendant was incompetent and, hence, 
would not establish obvious error in the court's failure to sua sponte embark on a 
competency inquiry. See Jacobs, 2001 UT 17, f 16 (bizarre behavior alone does not 
present a substantial question of possible doubt as to a defendant's competency so 
as to require a judge to sua sponte set a competency hearing). 
Accordingly, this Court should reject Defendant's unsupported, self-serving 
claims relating to his mental competence. 
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B. The Inadequate Record Defeats Defendant's Claim of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
actually file a competency petition after having requested time to do so.3 See Aplt. 
Br. at 48-51. To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, Defendant must "show that 
counsel's performance was deficient" and that "the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. 
C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, Tf 13, P.3d . "[A] court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial 
strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91,101,76 
S.Ct. 158) (emphasis added); State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 39,55 R3d 1134, cert 
den'd 63 P.3d 104 (Utah Jan. 13,2003). To establish prejudice, Defendant must prove 
that "counsel's errors actually had an adverse effect on the defense and that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ^ 40, 247 P.3d 344 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, Utah v. Ott, S. Ct. , 2011 WL 589441 
3
 This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel appears in Defendant's brief at 
Point 4 . See Aplt. Br. at 48-51. 
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(Utah Feb. 22, 2011); C.D.L., 2011 UT 55, \ 13. "A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome/' Taylor v. State, 2007 
UT 12,1f 56,156 P.3d 739 (internal quotation marks omitted), reh'g den'd (3/27/07). 
'"Additionally, proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative 
matter but must be a demonstrable reality/" See Munguia, 2011 UT 5,130 (quoting 
Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, f 36,203 P.3d 976) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
If a defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, his claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel fails as a matter of law. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687, 697; C.D.L., 2011 UT 55, f 13; Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 1 38. "Given the 
arduous nature of the defendant's burden, ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
rarely succeed." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351,354 (Utah App. 1993). 
Defendant's claim fails because it relies entirely on the existence of 
information which does not appear in the appellate record. He claims his counsel 
was deficient because she failed to file a competency petition despite her knowledge 
of Defendant's behavior problems, his "history of anger and depression[,]" and the 
multiple meetings between counsel and Defendant during which they discussed his 
victimization as a youth and his juvenile court experience. See Aplt. Br. at 48-49. 
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However, neither the information nor trial counsel's knowledge of it is 
substantiated in the record.4 See Point IA, supra. 
Further, Defendant claims that his counsel's conduct was prejudicial because 
even if an alienist deemed him to be competent, he "would most likely have been" 
diagnosed as suffering from "a substantial mental illness" such as "severe 
depression" and could have been "properly medicated" and could possibly have 
pled guilty and mentally ill. See Aplt. Br. at 50. However, the record is devoid of 
any of the information necessary to demonstrate that Defendant suffers from, or is 
likely to be diagnosed as having, severe depression or any other "substantial 
mental illness." See id. Even Defendant's single reference to having been on 
medication—made at sentencing—was not given any context as to time, type, or 
purpose. R. 176:36. 
Defendant carries the burden of not only establishing his claim of ineffective 
assistance, but of assuring that "the record is adequate" to support his claim. See 
C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, Tf 39 (citing State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f f 16-17,19,12 
P.3d 92). Where he is aware of "any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully 
4
 Defendant also notes that he informed his counsel that he had been "off his 
medications for many months." Aplt. Br. at 49. That information does not appear in 
the record until sentencing, and nothing in the record reveals that Defendant's trial 
counsel knew the information prior to his entry of his guilty plea. R. 176:36. 
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appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support" his ineffectiveness 
claim, he has the opportunity to attempt to develop the necessary record. See C.D.L., 
2011 UT App 55, % 39; Utah R. App. P. 23B. Defendant made no attempt to avail 
himself of that opportunity in this case. Consequently, the record remains 
inadequate to support his purely speculative assertions, and this Court must 
construe the record in favor of a "finding that counsel performed effectively" in 
deciding not to petition for a competency hearing. See C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, f 42; 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 17 ("[w]here the record appears inadequate in any fashion, 
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of 
a finding that counsel performed effectively."). 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN TAKING DEFENDANTS 
GUILTY PLEA WHERE THE COURT PROPERLY 
INCORPORATED THE PLEA AFFIDAVIT INTO THE RECORD 
AND STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH RULE 11(E) THROUGH 
BOTH THE AFFIDAVIT AND THE COLLOQUY 
Defendant contends that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, when it took his guilty plea. See Aplt. Br. at 37-43. He 
faults the judge on three points: (1) failure to strictly comply with rule 11(e); (2) 
failure to properly incorporate the plea affidavit into the record; and (3) failure to 
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properly establish that Defendant read, understood, and acknowledged the plea 
affidavit and, hence, knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. See id. at 38. 
A. Appellate Review is Unwarranted Because Defendant's Rule 
11 Claims are Largely Unpreserved, and, in Any Event, His 
Counsel Invited any Error 
Defendant alleges a number of errors in the taking of his guilty plea, none of 
which warrant appellate review. Defendant raised several of the alleged errors 
below, but then sought a ruling based solely on Defendant's understanding of the 
maximum possible sentence, thereby inviting any error in the trial court's failure to 
address the abandoned claims. The remaining appellate claims are not properly 
before this Court for review because they were not preserved below, and Defendant 
argues neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances. Moreover, defense 
counsel's conduct below invited any error in the taking of Defendant's plea, again 
preventing appellate review. 
Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court did not properly 
incorporate the plea affidavit into the record and that the judge failed to establish 
that Defendant had read, understood and acknowledged the document. See Aplt. 
Br. at 38,40-41. He also claims that the affidavit itself contains numerous errors. See 
id. at 41-42. Finally, he claims that the plea colloquy was deficient because the judge 
failed to inform Defendant of, or inquire about, the following: 
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His right to the presumption of innocence; 
His right against compulsory self-incrimination; 
His right to compel defense witnesses; 
His understanding of the nature of the elements of the subject offense; 
His right to have the State prove at trial each element beyond a reasonable 
doubt; 
His understanding that the guilty plea would admit all the elements or would 
represent his belief that the State's evidence presented a substantial risk of 
conviction; 
His knowledge that the plea resulted from prior plea discussions in which a 
plea agreement involving sentencing was reached; 
The fact that the sentencing recommendations were not binding on the court; 
The fact that a motion to withdraw the plea had to be filed prior to sentencing 
and may or may not be granted; 
The fact that the plea would limit his right of appeal; 
Whether his plea was voluntarily made; 
Whether he was under the influence of any substance or was being treated for 
mental health issues; 
Whether he was satisfied with his counsel; 
Whether he had reviewed the plea agreement with his counsel and 
understood it; and 
Whether he had been pressured or threatened by anyone to enter the plea. 
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See id. at 39-40. 
Defendant raised significantly fewer claims below. In his written motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea, his counsel summarily claimed only that the court: 
• Failed to inform Defendant of the elements of the crime to which he pleaded 
guilty; 
• Failed to inform him that he would not be allowed to appeal his conviction 
based upon his guilty plea; 
• Failed to inform him that he could ask to withdraw his plea prior to 
sentencing; and 
• Never established that the plea was voluntarily entered. 
R. 114. Defense counsel later verbally presented the trial court with an additional 
claim: Defendant's failure to understand that he faced a possible maximum 
sentence of life in prison. R. 176: 20,32. 
1. Defendant Failed to Preserve the Majority of his Claims 
A comparison of these two lists reveals that the majority of Defendant's 
claimed deficiencies in the taking of his guilty plea were not preserved below and, 
hence, are not properly before this Court for appellate review. "[A] timely and 
specific objection must be made [in the trial court] in order to preserve an issue for 
appeal/' State v. Finder, 2005 UT15, % 45,114 P.3d 551, reh'g den'd (6/1/05); State v. 
Rangei, 866 P.2d 607,611 (Utah App. 1993). "The objection must 'be specific enough 
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to give the trial court notice of the very error' of which [the party] complains." State 
v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills 
Water Co., 912 P.2d 457,460 (Utah App.1996)) (citation omitted). Accordingly, this 
Court should refuse to review Defendant's unpreserved claims of error unless 
Defendant can establish an exception to the preservation requirement. See Finder, 
2005 UT 15, % 45 (an appellate court reviews an unpreserved claim only if the party 
" articulate [s] an appropriate justification for appellate review," such as plain error 
or exceptional circumstances); State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, \ 21 n.2, 61 P.3d 1062 
("When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, we will nevertheless review the 
issue if the appealing party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional 
circumstances."); State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11,10 P.3d 346 (the preservation rule 
"applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional 
circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred"). 
Defendant's failure to address any such exception in his argument justifies 
summary rejection of his unpreserved claims. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, f^ 51 
(declining to review a claim for plain error or exceptional circumstances when 
neither was raised in the opening brief). He references both plain error and 
exceptional circumstances in the "Statement of Issues" at the beginning of his brief. 
See Aplt. Br. at 4. However, his argument references only the appellate standard of 
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review for a preserved rule 11 claim, with no mention of any exception to the 
preservation requirement and no attempt to establish that the unpreserved claims of 
error were either obvious or harmful. See id. at 37-43. Consequently, this Court 
should decline to review his unpreserved claims on appeal. 
2. Defendant Invited any Error in the Taking of his Plea When 
he Conceded the Thoroughness of the Colloquy Below 
This Court may also refuse to review Defendant's claims, including those 
preserved in his motion below, under the doctrine of invited error. That doctrine 
permits this Court to decline "to engage in even plain error review when counsel, 
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she 
had no objection." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14,128 P.3d 1171 (quotations and 
citation omitted), cert, denied, 230 P.3d 127 (Utah Apr. 22, 2010). This "arises from 
the principle that a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when 
that party led the trial court into committing the error." Id. at % 15. It also 
"discourage[s] parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve 
a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. Thus, where counsel "confirm[s] on 
the record that the defense had no objection" or "fail[s] to object . . . when 
specifically queried by the court," the invited error doctrine bars plain error review. 
See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,110, 86 P.3d 742. 
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Here, after focusing the trial court's attention on the sufficiency of the plea 
colloquy and the voluntariness of the plea, defense counsel narrowed her claims of 
error to a single claim: Defendant's failure to understand the potential maximum 
sentence for aggravated kidnapping. Twice, when addressing her written motion in 
open court, defense counsel conceded that, after she listened to the tape of the 
August plea hearing, she believed the trial judge "did a very good job going over 
the issues . . . that are required to be addressed" in taking a guilty plea and that the 
judge "asked every question that needed to be asked." R. 176:19, 31. She argued 
instead that, despite the court's thoroughness in the taking of the plea, Defendant 
did not understand that his sentence had a potential maximum term of "life" in 
prison. R. 176:20-22, 32. That issue, she explained, was "really the basis for the 
motion to have his guilty plea withdrawn." R. 176:32. The trial judge understood as 
much because when he denied the motion, he spoke only to his belief that 
Defendant should have been aware of the maximum sentence and commenting that 
Defendant may yet be released in less than the six-year minimum applicable to his 
plea. R. 176:33. 
Defense counsel's argument effectively informed the court that Defendant no 
longer had any objection to the sufficiency of the plea colloquy or to the plea 
affidavit and, instead, focused the court's attention solely on Defendant's claimed 
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misunderstanding about the possible maximum sentence. Consequently, counsel 
invited any error in the trial court's failure to address any other claims involving 
rule 11(e) compliance.5 See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14 (the invited error doctrine 
precludes even plain error review on appeal); State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 
1997) (holding that, "'[i]f a party through counsel. . . has led the trial court into 
error, [this Court] will then decline to save that party from the error7") (quoting State 
v. Bullock 791 P.2d 155,158 (Utah 1989)) (emphasis omitted). 
B. Defendant's Claim Fails on its Merits 
In any event, there was no error, let alone obvious error, in the taking of 
Defendant's plea below because the court not only properly incorporated the plea 
affidavit into the record, but the affidavit and the colloquy combined to strictly 
comply with rule 11. 
Whether a trial court has strictly complied with rule 11 "may be demonstrated 
on appeal by reference to the record of the plea proceedings/' State v. Maguire, 830 
P.2d 216,217 (Utah 1992). The record may reflect the trial court's compliance with 
rule 11 by "multiple means, e.g., transcript of the oral colloquy between the court 
5
 Defendant does not address the invited error doctrine, but argues in Point 3 
of his brief that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because she did not 
assert his rule 11 complaints at oral argument below. See Aplt. Br. at 43-44. The 
State responds to his argument in Point III, infra. 
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and defendant, contents of a written affidavit that the record reflects was read, 
understood, and acknowledged by defendant and the court, contents of other 
documents such as the information, presentence reports, exhibits, etc., similarly 
incorporated into the record and so on." Id. at 218. However, 
. . . if an affidavit is used to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be 
addressed during the plea hearing. The trial court must conduct an 
inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the affidavit and 
voluntarily signed it Any omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit 
must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties 
raised in the course of the plea colloquy. Then the affidavit itself, 
signed by the required parties, can be incorporated into the record. 
Id. at 217-18 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470,477 (Utah App. 1991)). 
In other words, when an affidavit has been properly incorporated into the 
record, "the trial court need not 'perform a verbatim recitation of each and every 
statement in the defendant's affidavit'" in order to comply with rule 11. State v. 
Penman, 964 P.2d 1157,1161 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 814 
P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991), cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)). Rather, the 
trial court may rely on a properly incorporated affidavit in complying with the 
requirements of rule 11. Penman, 964 P.2d at 1160-61. 
To properly incorporate a plea affidavit into the colloquy, '"[t]he trial court 
must conduct an inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the affidavit 
and voluntarily signed it /" and must clarify omissions and ambiguities in the 
29 
affidavit and uncertainties which are raised in the colloquy. Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 
(quoting Smith, 812 P.2d at 477). 
1. The Trial Court Properly Incorporated the Plea Affidavit 
Defendant claims that the trial court did not properly incorporate the plea 
affidavit into the record because the judge failed to establish that Defendant had 
read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the plea affidavit. See Aplt. Br. 
at 40-41. A fair reading of the plea colloquy refutes that claim. 
The transcript demonstrates that the trial judge not only expressly confirmed 
that Defendant had "gone over" the plea affidavit, but inquired whether he had in 
fact "read" it and whether he understood it. R. 176:15. Defendant gave an 
unequivocal "yes" response to each question. Id. The judge reviewed several 
"primary rights" with Defendant that were contained within the plea affidavit, 
including his right to a jury trial, his right to call and cross-examine witnesses, his 
right to appeal his conviction, and his right to have the jury convict him only upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Compare R. 176:14-15 with R. 105-06. The judge 
explained to Defendant that the plea affidavit explained "all of the rights that [he 
was] giving up" by pleading guilty, including not only the rights that were being 
discussed in court, but also "many others[.]" R. 176:15. The judge admonished 
Defendant that the written agreement would, in effect, be conclusive notice that he 
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gave up the rights outlined therein. Id. He then asked Defendant if he understood 
the explanation, to which Defendant responded, "Yes." Id. The judge proceeded to 
establish the factual basis for the plea, reviewed the potential sentence, and then 
watched as Defendant executed the written plea agreement. R. 176:15-17. He then 
asked Defendant if he had any questions and, receiving a negative response, had 
him enter his plea. R. 176:17. This formed a basis from which the trial could 
conclude that Defendant had read and understood the contents of the affidavit. 
In addition, the plea agreement provides that Defendant and his attorney 
"fully discussed this statement, [Defendant's] rights, and the consequences of [his] 
guilty plea(s)." R. 106. Further, the six paragraphs preceding Defendant's signature 
on the plea affidavit provide that: the plea is the result of Defendant's "own free 
will and choice [;]" he was not coerced into entering it; he had read the affidavit and 
understood its contents; he had made all the changes he wished to make; he was 
satisfied with his counsel's advice and assistance; he could read and understand 
English; his judgment was not impaired by drugs, medication, or intoxicants; he 
was of sound mind and was mentally able to understand the proceedings and their 
consequences; and he was aware both of the need to seek withdrawal of his plea 
prior to sentencing if he wished and of the fact that it would be granted only upon a 
showing that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. R. 102-03. This 
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reinforces the trial court's determination that Defendant had read and understood 
the contents of the affidavit. 
Finally, Defendant contends that the plea affidavit contains errors which were 
left uncorrected by the trial court. See Aplt. Br. at 41-42. He argues that: (1) the 
affidavit should have provided for a "no contest" or Alford plea because Defendant 
did not agree with the underlying facts but simply agreed that the State could obtain 
a conviction on those facts; (2) the affidavit reflects an erroneous offense date of 
February 2 instead of March 2; and (3) the aggravated kidnapping elements in the 
affidavit reflect a sexually-related alternative intent that was unsupported by the 
factual basis for the plea. See id. His argument fails, however, because it was not 
preserved for appeal and, in any event, none of his points amounts to reversible 
error. 
First, the trial court is charged with clarifying omissions, ambiguities and 
uncertainties in the affidavit which are raised during the plea hearing. See Maguire, 
830 P.2d at 217. Defendant brought none of the alleged errors in the affidavit to the 
court's attention during the hearing. Neither did he raise any in his motion to 
withdraw his plea. Accordingly, he gave the lower court no opportunity to correct 
or clarify the alleged errors. Neither does he argue any exception to the 
preservation rule on appeal. Hence, the matter is not properly before this Court for 
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review. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 51 (declining to review issue not raised below 
when appellant did not argue "that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' 
justifies a review of the issue"); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
(same). 
Second, none of the allegations amount to error. The parties did not negotiate 
for a no contest or Alford plea, and nothing prevented them from agreeing to a guilty 
plea grounded on a belief that the State's facts were likely to result in a conviction 
following a trial. See generally Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (noting that the requisite factual 
basis for entry of a plea of guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill must 
demonstrate either that the accused "actually committed" the charged crime "or... 
that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction") (emphasis added). Consequently, the absence of a reference to a no 
contest or Alford plea does not establish error in the plea affidavit.6 
6
 Defendant's argument also faults the trial court for failing "to establish" that 
Defendant understood and agreed with the notation added to the plea affidavit 
noting that the recited facts are what the State would prove at trial, not what 
Defendant agreed he actually did. Aplt. Br. at 41 (referring to R. 107). The court had 
no such duty, however, in view of the affirmative representation by Defendant's 
trial counsel during the plea colloquy that "Mr. Poundstone doesn't agree with the 
way the facts are [stated], but we agree that that's the way the State would present 
the facts at trial . . . [and that they present] a substantial risk of conviction." R. 
176:15-16. Defendant made no effort to correct counsel's statement. Id. 
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Neither is the February 2 offense date reflected in the plea affidavit erroneous. 
The March 2 date noted by Defendant is the date reflected in the information for the 
aggravated assault charge (Count 2), which was dismissed as a result of the plea 
agreement. R. 2. February 2 is the date reflected in the information for the 
aggravated kidnapping offense for which Defendant entered his plea. R. 3. 
Accordingly, use of the February 2 date in the plea affidavit, as well as during the 
plea colloquy, is not error. R. 107; R. 176:15-16. 
Finally, the inclusion of an alternative intent element in the plea affidavit did 
not prevent the trial court from properly incorporating the affidavit into the record. 
The State charged Defendant with aggravated kidnapping, including in the 
information two alternative intents derived from the charging statute: an intent "to 
inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or. . . [an intent] to 
commit a sexual offense " R. 3. The plea affidavit reflected the same elements, 
expressed in the disjunctive, using the same language from the charging statute. R. 
107. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1)(b) (West Supp. 2010). 
Defendant contends that inclusion of the alternative intent was 
"objectionable" because it was irrelevant to his plea, but he fails to establish that its 
inclusion amounted to reversible error. Aplt. Br. at 42. The factual recitation that 
follows the elements in the affidavit clearly establishes that Defendant acted "with 
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intent to inflict bodily injury on A.M. or to terrorize her." R. 107. Nothing in the 
affidavit or in the plea colloquy brought that element into doubt. Defendant did not 
claim to harbor any other intent, and he does not suggest that he was mislead or 
confused by inclusion of the alternative intent language. Under the facts at hand, 
the challenged language was mere surplusage that had no impact on Defendant's 
understanding of the plea affidavit, did not render the affidavit ambiguous or 
uncertain, and did not prevent incorporation of the plea affidavit into the record. 
In sum, the trial court confirmed in a meaningful colloquy that Defendant had 
read the plea affidavit, had reviewed it with his counsel, and was aware of its 
essential contents. See Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-18. In the course thereof, Defendant 
unequivocally assured the court that he had in fact read the document and 
understood its contents and that he had no questions concerning the agreement or 
its contents. Further, he demonstrated no uncertainty or indecision in executing the 
agreement in open court. That was sufficient to incorporate the plea affidavit into 
the record for purposes of determining rule 11 compliance. See, e.g., Penman, 964 
P.2d at 1160-61 (plea affidavit could properly be used in conjunction with plea 
colloquy to determine strict rule 11 compliance). 
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2. The Plea Colloquy, Together with the Plea Affidavit, 
Achieved Strict Compliance with Rule 11 
Between the trial court's colloquy and Defendant's thorough plea affidavit, 
Defendant was fully apprised of his rights as required by rule 11. The colloquy 
itself did not extend to all the requirements of rule 11(e), but the trial judge made 
clear that he was accepting and entering the plea in accordance with the agreement 
based both on the colloquy and on the plea agreement itself. R. 176:17. The plea 
affidavit included every constitutional right challenged by Defendant on appeal. 
Corn-pare Aplt. Br. at 37-42 with R. 101-08. It also set forth each of the elements of 
aggravated kidnapping and summarized the conduct by Defendant that fulfilled 
those elements, notwithstanding Defendant's claim to the contrary. R. 107. 
Because the record demonstrates that the trial court strictly complied with 
rule 11, this Court should reject Defendant's contrary claim. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA 
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, he argues that his failure to 
understand the maximum possible sentence for aggravated kidnapping justified 
withdrawal of his plea absent proof of prejudice to the State. See Aplt. Br. at 45-47. 
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He then claims that withdrawal should have been granted because the trial court 
failed to properly incorporate the plea affidavit into the record, failed to comply 
with rule 11(e), and failed to establish that his plea was knowing and voluntary. See 
id. at 47-48. Finally, he argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by submitting the withdrawal motion to the trial court on the sentencing issue 
alone. See id. at 43-44,47-48. 
A, The Record Reflects that Defendant Understood the Maximum 
Possible Sentence 
Defendant first contends that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea 
because he did not understand that the crime to which he was pleading guilty 
carried a potential sentence of up to life in prison. See id. at 45-46. He argues that he 
was not advised in court of the maximum sentence until the plea hearing when he 
discovered that the plea affidavit twice mentioned the fact. See id. at 45-47. This 
was insufficient, he argues, because the plea affidavit was not properly incorporated 
into the record and the record belies the statements of both the prosecutor and the 
judge that they had previously advised Defendant on the record of the potential for 
a life sentence. Id. 
Regardless of when Defendant was first advised of the fact "on the record/' 
he was in fact informed of the maximum sentence before the plea hearing. His trial 
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counsel admitted that she had informed him of that fact, albeit not every time they 
spoke of sentencing. R. 176:32 (counsel admits she "didn't always every time [she] 
spoke with [Defendant] say 6 to life, 6 to life."). She also stated, that "several times 
from the beginning of this lawsuit Mr. Poundstone has been advised, told, reminded 
that he was looking at potentially a life sentence[.]" R. 176:22. 
Further, the trial judge believed that Defendant "was aware of" the maximum 
sentence, noting that it had most recently been mentioned during a discussion on 
sentencing held in his chambers immediately prior to the plea hearing. R. 176:33. 
Although the in-chambers meeting does not appear to have been either reported or 
transcribed, the record demonstrates that the parties made no effort to challenge the 
judge's statement, and it contains nothing to contradict it. Hence, this Court should 
presume the veracity of the judge's reasoning. See Tlteison, 709 P.2d at 309 (when an 
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the Court must presume 
that the missing portions support the action of the district court). 
In any event, the plea affidavit and the colloquy alerted Defendant to the 
maximum possible sentence before he entered his plea. The first page of the plea 
affidavit expressly provides that the potential sentence for aggravated kidnapping is 
"6, 10, or 15 years and could be for life in the USP[.]" R. 108. Thereafter, the 
affidavit explains that, as part of the plea bargain, "[t]he State agreed to recommend 
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that the defendant be sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than six (6) 
years and could be for life in the Utah State Prison/7 R. 104. The affidavit included 
"Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness" which specifically stated that 
Defendant had read the affidavit or had it read to him, understood its contents, and 
adopted each statement. R. 103; R. 176:17. 
In addition, defense counsel and the trial judge both verbally stated at the 
plea hearing that the potential sentence was "6,10 or 15 to life/' R. 176:17. The 
judge asked Defendant immediately thereafter if he understood the potential 
sentence, to which Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." Id. Only then did the court 
have Defendant execute the plea affidavit and enter the guilty plea. Id. 
In light of the record evidence that Defendant had been informed of and 
understood the appropriate indeterminate sentence, his claim to the contrary 
necessarily fails. 
B. The Record Reflects no Errors in the Taking of Defendant's 
Plea; Alternatively, Defense Counsel Invited Any Error 
Defendant also contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea based on the judge's failure to properly incorporate the 
plea affidavit into the record and to otherwise strictly comply with rule 11(e) in the 
taking of the plea. See Aplt. Br. at 44-45,48. This claim fails for the reasons set forth 
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in Point II, supra. Not only did the trial judge properly incorporate the affidavit and 
strictly comply with rule 11(e), but any error that might be found was invited by 
trial counsel's argument to the trial court that withdrawal of the plea turned on the 
sole issue of Defendant's understanding of the maximum possible sentence. See 
Point II, supra. 
G Defense Counsel was not Ineffective for Failing to Pursue a 
Futile Claim 
Defendant attempts to salvage his rule 11 arguments by alleging that his trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to pursue them below. See Aplt. 
Br. at 43-44,47-48, 51. His claim, however, is inadequately briefed. 
The rules of appellate procedure require a party to set forth the "contentions 
and reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "An argument 
that does not contain 'reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority' is 
inadequately briefed and we will not consider the issue." State v. Sloan, 2003 UT 
App 170,«f15 n.l, 72 P.3d 138. 
Here, Defendant's discussion of his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness appears 
without citation to any authority setting forth the standards for an ineffective 
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assistance of counsel claim, let alone an explanation as to how those standards apply 
to his claim under the facts at hand. See Aplt. Br. at 43-44,47-48. Such authority is, 
instead, presented in Point 4 of Defendant's brief, but that Point does not address 
defense counsel's failure to pursue a ruling on his rule 11 claims. See id. at 48-51. 
Neither does Defendant make any reference to Strickland's prejudice prong. See id. 
at 43-44, 47-48. This leaves it to the State and, ultimately, this Court to determine 
how Strickland's two-pronged analysis applies in this particular legal context. "This 
approach to appellate advocacy flies in the face of our oft-repeated reminder that 
the appellate courts of this state are not a depository in which the appealing party 
may dump the burden of argument and research/' State v. Smith, 2010 UT App 231, 
Tf 2, 238 P.3d 1103. This Court should therefore decline to address Defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Point 4 of Defendant's brief deals largely with his claim that his trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance in dealing with the competency issue. See Aplt. Br. 
at 48-51. The only other claim presented in Point IV consists of a single sentence: "It 
se[e]ms clear also that Tr[ia]l Counsel should have properly objected to the denial of 
the Motion to Withdraw Guilty plea following the Trial Court's summary denial of 
the motion." Id. at 51. Because the statement is made without clarification or 
support and contains no corresponding argument of prejudice, it is inadequately 
briefed, and this Court need not review it. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a); Sloan, 2003 UT 
App 170, If 15 n.l (an issue lacking reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal 
authority is inadequately briefed and will not be considered on appeal). 
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In any event, the claim fails on its merits. As established in Point II, supra, the 
trial court properly incorporated the plea affidavit into the record and strictly 
complied with rule 11(e), having properly incorporated and relied, in part, on the 
plea affidavit in accepting the plea. Accordingly, any additional effort by 
Defendant's trial counsel to pursue a challenge based on the rule 11 claims would 
have been futile, defeating Defendant's ineffective assistance claim. See State v. 
Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, Tf 119, 24, 227 P.3d 1264 (no ineffectiveness in failing to 
make futile motions or objections), cert denied 238 P.3d 443 (Utah July 27,2010); State 
v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, t 34, 989 P.2d 52 (same). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted Marcher \ 2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
~^¥$$C. LEONARD y^ / 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
KB Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
•HRULE 11. PLEAS 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives 
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to 
confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A 
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail 
shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, 
of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until 
the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these 
rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial 
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was 
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of 
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been 
reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these 
factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read 
or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
( f ) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty 
and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion 
under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as 
defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, 
it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not 
render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance 
of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by 
the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
( i ) ( l ) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting 
attorney. 
(0(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may 
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall 
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
( j ) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, 
guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the 
adverse determination of any specified pre-tnal motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw 
the plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court 
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann 5 77-16a-103. 
(!) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole Any variance from the procedures 
required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, 
by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002; April 1, 
2005; November 1, 2005; January 1, 2008 ] 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 24 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
H Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
H Title V. General Provisions 
#RULE 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order 
indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out 
on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other 
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the 
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part 
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief 
under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, 
and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance 
with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the 
arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request 
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a ) ( l l ) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum 
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: • 
(a)( l l ) (A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)( l l ) (B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of 
central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)( l l )(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as 
the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, 
except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to 
the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, 
the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply 
briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum 
references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used 
in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the 
employee," "the injured person/ "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule l l f f l or l l f q ) . References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall 
be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference 
shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall 
not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing 
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-
appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be 
deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file 
two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the 
issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply 
to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant 
(9)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon 
motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule The motion shall state with specificity the 
«ssues to be bnefed, the number of add't'o^a1 pages requested, a^d the good cause fo«- granting t^e motion. A motion f»*ed 
at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by 
a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional 
pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection If the motion is granted, any responding 
party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court Whether the motion is granted 
or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or 
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party 
after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of 
the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the 
supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words Any response shall be made within 7 days of 
filing and shall be similarly limited 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged 
with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees 
against the offending lawyer. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; 
November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006; November 1, 2006; April 1, 2008.] 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
AUGUST 1 4 , 2008 
THE COURT: Next case is Brian William Poundstone. 
MS. MIYA: Your Honor, this matter was set for trial 
and the State had to continue because of a witness problem. We 
actually have resolved the matter and Mr. Poundstone will be 
pleading today. We've got paperwork. 
THE COURT: What is proposed? 
MS. MIYA: In exchange for Mr. Poundstone's guilty 
plea to Count 1, the felony aggravated kidnapping, the State 
has agreed to dismiss Count 2 and we actually -- well, Count 2 
will be dismissed upon Mr. Poundstone's accepting Count 1. 
Mr. Poundstone will need a presentence report. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Poundstone, are you aware that 
you don't have to do this? That you can have a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And by entering into this plea agreement 
you will not get to have that trial. You give up your right to 
have your lawyer confront and cross-examine witnesses. You're 
giving up your right to appeal if convicted? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You're giving up your right to have you 
in here in civilian clothes. The jury won't know that you're 
in custody. I will instruct your jury that if any of them had 
a reasonable doubt after the State's evidence, they should not 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
vote to convict you. Those are the primary rights that you are 
giving up. 
There's an affidavit in advance of guilty plea. The 
paperwork there on the podium. Have you gone over that? Have 
you read it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. That explains all of the rights 
that you're giving up. In addition to the ones we've talked 
about there are many others there. You should understand if 
you sign that document, it will be put in your file and it will 
be noticed to anyone that looks in there that you've given up 
all those rights. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: What's the factual basis here? What 
happened? 
MS. MIYA: What we're going to do, your Honor, is we 
agreed that the State -- the facts that the State presents are 
the ones that they would use if we were to go to trial. 
Mr. Poundstone doesn't agree with the way the facts are, but we 
agree that that's the way the State would present the facts at 
trial. 
MR. CHARLES: The facts the State is relying on, your 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
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Honor, is that on February 2nd of this year Mr. Poundstone 
followed the victim, a juvenile, whose initials are AM into a 
church here in Roosevelt. After following her, I don't know 
how far in the church, he got her in a headlock, pulled her 
into one of the rooms off the side of the hallway. While he 
was doing that he was holding a knife to her throat. He told 
her to sit down in a chair in the room that he drug her into 
and closed the door and told her to sit there and she wouldn't 
get hurt. 
After a small amount of time passed an adult came 
into the room, saw the two of them there. He put away the 
knife. The juvenile told this adult that she needed to talk to 
her. Mr. Poundstone fled the scene. A member there at the 
church followed him and eventually Officer Tucker found him 
that same day. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Miya, you were aware of the 
facts involved in preparing for trial in this case. Do you 
believe looking at the State's evidence that there is -- if the 
facts were reasonably believed by a jury, that there is a 
substantial chance of conviction? 
MS. MIYA: I believe that, yes, your Honor. I 
believe there's a substantial risk of conviction. It's not 100 
percent but --
THE COURT: Well, it's never 10 0 percent. 
MS. MIYA: But it's high, but, yes, there's a 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
substantial risk. Mr. Poundstone has -- we've spent a lot of 
time talking about the risks of going to trial, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is prison mandatory, Mr. Charles? 
MR. CHARLES: I'm sorry, your Honor. I was -- oh, 
prison is mandatory, yes. 
THE COURT: And before I take your plea, 
Mr. Poundstone, I need to advise you of that. First-degree 
felony could impose a zero, excuse me, five to life sentence. 
MS. MIYA: This one, your Honor, is a 6, 10 or 15 to 
life. 
THE COURT: 6, 10 or 15 to life, okay. You 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I'll have you sign off on that plea 
affidavit. Mr. Poundstone, do you have any questions? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: To the charge in Count 1 of the 
Information aggravated kidnapping, a first-degree felony, on or 
about February 2nd, 2008, what is your plea? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Based on the plea and the plea agreement, 
the Court will dismiss Count 2 in its entirety. I will refer 
this to Adult Probation and Parole. I'll get a report to 
assist us in sentencing. You think a psychosexual evaluation 
is appropriate here? 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
MR. CHARLES: We had talked about that, Ms. Miya and 
I, your Honor, and initially I was going to ask for one and 
decided where prison is mandatory he'll be in therapy there. I 
think that they'll be able to figure it out and if they need 
one later, can get it there from the prison. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's get a sentencing date on 
this, refer it to AP&P. They'll come over to the jail and talk 
to you. Cooperate with them and we'll get this (inaudible.) 
Set it for sentencing October 23rd. Thank you. 
(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.) 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, 
Defendant 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Criminal No. 081000069 
Judge John R. Anderson 
L Brian William Poundstone, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of 
and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s): 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
ravated Kidnapping 
Degree 
First Degree Felony-
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
6, 10, or 15 years and could be 
for life in the USP 
and/or $10,000 fine 
I have received a copy of the Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to me, 
and I understand the nature and the elements of crimes to which I am pleading guilty. 
0 u L i 0 U 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are: 
Aggravated Kidnapping - a First Degree Felony 
That on or about February 2, 2008, in Duchesne County, State of Utah, in violation of 
Section 76-5-3024 UCA (1953) as amended, the defendant did, in the course of committing 
unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possess, use, or threaten to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) acted with intent: 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4 of the Utah 
Code (Sexual Offenses). 
THE VICTIM IS: A.M. DOB 02/26/1994 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of 
other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept 
my guilty plea and prove the elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty: 
Aggravated Kidnapping - a First Degree Felony 
That on or about February 2, 2008, in Duchesne County, State of Utah, I grabbed A.M. 
and pulled her into a room at the LDS church. I put my knife against her neck and told her to 
stay calm and don't move or say anything and she wouldn't get hurt. I did this with intent to 
inflict bodily injury on A.M. or to terrorize her. 
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Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering this plea voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the 
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up 
all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crime to which I am pleading guilty. I 
also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Stephanie K. Miya. My attorney 
and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) 
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-
examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
would pay those costs. 
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Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to 
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if 
I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I 
am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime. If I choose to 
fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At 
a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each 
juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be 
admitting that I committed the crime stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory 
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penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my 
sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including 
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I 
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea(s) now may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading 
guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose 
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences 
would be inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty plea is a result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are 
fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
1. The defendant will plead guilty as charged to Count 1, Aggravated Kidnapping, a 
First Degree Felony. 
2. The State agrees to recommend that the defendant be sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not less than six (6) years and could be for life in the Utah State Prison. 
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Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge 
may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those 
contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
lam years of age. I have attended school through the grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
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from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file 
a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand that 
for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made 
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea 
if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge 
to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act in Title 78 Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this ftf day of August, 2008. 
BRIAN WILLIAM POUNDSTONE 
DEFENDANT 
Deputy Duchesn ty Attorney 
MHV 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for Brian William Poundstone, the defendant above, and 
that I know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him. I have discussed it with him 
and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly 
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in 
the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
Bar No. 9402 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case Brian William Poundstone, 
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence 
would support the conviction of defendant for the offenses for which the pleas are entered and fiiat 
the acceptance of the pleas would serve the public interest. 
Bar No. 10865 
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Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, Ihe Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that the defendant's guilty pleas are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty pleas to the crimes set forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this ft/ day of August, 20' 
( 
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Addendum D 
STEPHANIE KUUIPO MIYA #9402 
P.O. Box 711819 
Salt Lake City, UT 84171 
Telephone: 435/722-0770 
Facsimile: 801/943-8693 
A TTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
'ZPUTy 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. DEPARTMENT OF ROOSEVELT, 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ) 
BRIAN WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) MOTION TO 
) WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
) Case No.: 081000069 
) Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Sections 77-1-6 and 77-13-6; and the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure Rule 11, Defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, by and through 
his attorney of record, hereby moves this honorable court for an Order granting Defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw the "Guilty" pi. a Defendant entered before the court on August 14, 2008. 
The Motion is based on the following: 
Under Utah Rules of Crimin, 1 Procedure Rule 11 (e), the court may not accept a 
defendant's "guilty" plea until the ccurt has found: 
1. if the defendant is no represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and c 3es not desire counsel; 
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2. the plea is voluntarily made; 
3. the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, 
and that by entering 1 he plea, these rights are waived; 
4. A. the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those element beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
B. there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the 
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution 
has sufficient evidenv d to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
5. the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory lature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for 
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; 
6. if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if 
so, what agreement has been reached; 
7. the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
8. the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
Upon review of the audio recording of the entry of plea hearing on August 14, 2008, 
Defendant was informed by the cour of the following, which the court referred to as "primary 
rights" that Defendant was giving up by pleading "guilty:" 
1. The court asked Defendant if he was aware that he did not have to enter a plea, 
that he could have a jury trial, to which Defendant replied, "Yes;" 
2. The court told Defendant his attorney could confront and cross examine the 
state's witnesses at a trial; 
3. The court told Defendant he could appeal a conviction at a trial; 
4. The court told Defendant he could appear at his trial dressed in civilian clothing; 
5. The court told Defendant that at his trial the jury would be instructed that if there 
was a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, the jury must vote not to 
convict. 
When the court asked the defendant if he understood each of the above-referenced rights 
he was giving up, Defendant replied "Yes." 
The court then went on to vdify that Defendant had read and understood the "Statement 
of Defendant in Support of Guilty Piea and Certificate of Counsel," referred to by the court as 
the "Affidavit." Defendant answere "Yes," he had read the document, understood the 
document, and had gone over the document with his attorney. The court told Defendant that 
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when he signed the affidavit, it would be placed into his file and would be notice to anyone who 
read the file that Defendant was giving up the rights listed in the document. The court did not go 
over the rights listed in the documer •, which are paraphrased as follows: 
1. The plea is entered voluntarily by the defendant; 
2. The defendant underrands that by pleading guilty he gives up the following rights 
under the constitutions of the United States and Utah: 
a. The right to counsel; 
b. The nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which the defendant 
is pleading gu'lty; 
c. The defendants rights in this case and other cases, and the consequences 
of his pleadin* guilty; 
d. The right to a speedy and public trial before an impartial jury; 
e. The right to c nfront and cross examine the state's witnesses; 
f. The right to h.*ve his own witnesses appear, and to compel the attendance 
of those witnesses by subpoena if necessary; 
g. The right to testify in his own behalf or not to testify at his trial; 
h. The privilege against self-incrimination; 
i. The presumpt ion of innocence; 
j . The state's bidden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the 
crimes with M lich the defendant has been charged; 
k. The jury verdict must be unanimous; 
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1. The right to appeal the conviction. 
The state offered the factual basis for the conviction; Defendant offered to the court his 
disclaimer that, although he did not jgree with the facts as the state offered, he did agree that the 
facts, as offered by the state, were the facts the state would rely on were the lawsuit to go to trial 
The court then accepted the factual basis as offered by the state. 
The court then advised Defendant that a conviction would be punished by a mandatory 
term at the state prison of six, ten, or 15 years to life. Defendant then signed the affidavit in open 
court. Defense counsel and counsel for the state also signed the affidavit. 
The court then asked Defend nnt if he had any questions, to which Defendant replied, 
"No." The court then asked Defendant how he pleads to count one of the Information, to which 
Defendant answered, "Guilty." In accordance with the plea agreement, the court dismissed count 
two, ordered a presentencing investigation report, inquired as to the necessity of a psychosexual 
evaluation (the parties agreed that it was not necessary); and set sentencing on October 23, 2008, 
at 1:30 PM. 
Defendant claims that the co ..rt failed to inform him of the elements of the crime to 
which he pleaded guilty; that the court failed to inform him that he would not be allowed to 
appeal his conviction based upon hii. pleading guilty; that he could ask to have his guilty plea 
withdrawn prior to his sentencing; aud that the court never established that Defendant's plea was 
voluntarily entered. 
Wherefore, Defendant respectfully requests that the court grant Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his "guilty" plea based on :he court's failure to strictly comply with URCrP Rule 11 at 
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the entry of plea hearing. Defendant claims that lack of strict compliance is plain error that will 
result in manifest injustice if the plea is left to stand without first informing Defendant of all the 
constitutional and statutory rights he was waiving at the hearing. Defense counsel avers that this 
Motion is filed in good faith, at Defendant's direction, and prior to Defendant's sentence being 
pronounced 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this s ^ ^ c day of September, 2008. 
STEPHANIE KUUIPO MIYA 
ktomeyfor Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA was D mailed, first-class, postage prepaid c^jThand-delivered (interoffice 
file in court clerk's office) D FAXed to the party named below on the ^ day of 
September, 2008. 
Stephen D. Foote 
Duchesne County Attorney 
Grant H. Charles 
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney 
P. O. Box 206 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Addendum E 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT ROOSEVELT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH p|L=E> 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY UTMn 
STATE OF UTAH 
P l a i n t i f f , 
V S . 
BRIAN WILLIAM POUNDSTONE 
Defendant. 
JUL 0 9 2010 
BY. 
CASE NO. 081000069 
APPELLATE #: 20090597 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
and EDWIN T. PETERSON 
EIGHTH DISTRICT - ROOSEVELT 
255 S. STATE STREET 
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066 
HEARINGS 
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED ON 
March 3, 13, 2008; April 10, 2008; May 8, 2008; June 5, 19, 
2008; August 14, 200 8; October 20, 200 8; November 3, 2 008; 
September 21, 2009; May 27, 2010 
RLED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
ORIGINAL 
Reported by: Colleen C. Southwick, RPR/CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
OCTOBER 2 0 , 2 0 0 8 
THE COURT: Next case is Brian William Poundstone. 
Okay. Brian William Poundstone is present in custody. MS. 
Miya is his counsel. 
Court has received and reviewed the report from Adult 
Probation and Parole. Ms. Miya, have you gone over this with 
your client? 
MS. MIYA: I have, your Honor, but just a couple of 
presentencing matters. Mr. Poundstone asked me to file a 
motion to have his guilty plea withdrawn and I was under the 
understanding that's what we were going to be -- that motion is 
before the Court right now, and Mr. Poundstone wanted to 
address the Court to supplement the motion that I filed. I 
believe the State didn't file a response because it was set for 
a hearing today. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, this is new to me. I've 
only seen it just today. 
MS. MIYA: Your Honor, the biggest issue, and I had 
Ms. Wilson make an audio recording of uhe hearing, the plea 
hearing so I could go over it and make sure that the colloquy 
was in substantial compliance, your Honor, and it actually --
you did a very good job going over the issues that had to be --
that are required to be addressed. Mr. Poundstone had some 
comments to make to the Court as well that didn't involve 
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statutory problems, but the biggest issue on the withdrawal of 
the guilty plea is that during all of the discussions that I 
had with Mr. Poundstone, every time we talked about possible 
sanctions, basically we were talking about six instead of six 
to life. 
I mean, I always said the 6, 10 or 15 and just in my 
mind knew that to life was added on there, but Mr. Poundstone 
says that he -- all he heard basically was 6, 10 or 15. And 
because we had discussed the sentencing, the sanctions that 
would be imposed at sentencing, Mr. Poundstone knew that there 
was going to be a six year minimum, but he -- I guess -- I 
don't know that it wasn't he didn't understand it, but because 
I always talked about six and never just said -- I mean, I 
didn't say six to life every time I talked about it, I think he 
maybe felt -- was under the understanding that it was going to 
be a six year prison sentence. I think that's where his 
understanding was. So he asked to have his guilty plea 
withdrawn because he did not understand that it was six to 
life. 
MR. CHARLES: Your Honor, I don't know how he 
couldn't understand. He was advised of that several times from 
the time of the initial appearance through the date that he 
actually entered his plea. And in the defense's motion, page 5 
the second paragraph down it says the Court then advised 
defendant that a conviction would be punished by a mandatory 
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term at the state prison of 6, 10 or 15 years to life. I think 
that - - I don' t know how we could have been more thorough in 
saying that a sealing on this was life. And so I see no basis 
for the withdrawal of the plea and join in what Ms. Miya said 
that I believe that the Court covered everything necessary 
under Rule 11 in taking the plea. 
MS. MIYA: And just -- I know --
MR. CHARLES: And additionally, your Honor -- sorry. 
If I could just finish. Additionally, the affidavit states 
that it's 6, 10, or 15 years to life. 
THE COURT: Which he read and signed. 
MR. CHARLES: Yeah, and acknowledged multiple times 
that he understood that he didn't have to do that and that he 
did understand the affidavit before he signed it. 
MS. MIYA: And, your Honor, just the very first time 
that I was in court ever was when I was in my teens and I had 
been arrested -- cited for making an improper U-turn. And when 
I went to court, the judge rattled off a whole bunch of things 
to me and all I heard him say was five days in jail and a $3 5 
fine so I know that there's -- it's hugely stressful to be in 
court. And even if you understand the English language, which 
Mr. Poundstone absolutely understands, reads, writes and 
understands the English language, but the stress factor, I 
think, is something that even though you say yes I understand 
what you're saying to me, it's not sinking in properly until 
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you have --he says basically when he got back to his room, he 
went over the paperwork again where he's in a less stressful 
environment than standing in front of the judge and realized 
that it wasn't just a six year sentence, it was a six to life 
and then he asked me to file the withdrawal. 
And it's true, Mr. Charles is absolutely right, 
several times from the beginning of this lawsuit Mr. Poundstone 
has been advised, told, reminded that he was looking at 
potentially a life sentence, but, again, every time I talked to 
him I said six. I didn't continue to re-enforce the 6 to life 
and I just knew in my mind it was 6 to life and just assumed 
that he was on the same track, on the same page that I was. 
THE COURT: Well, obviously I can't remember the 
colloquy that took place prior to taking the defendant's plea. 
And I don't have a Rule 11 form in front of me that I follow, 
but where there's a possibility of a mandatory life sentence, 
I'm usually very careful in that. And I guess that -- I guess 
that the standard here is was the defendant in a position where 
he did not knowingly enter the plea. And knowingly I guess 
depends on whether the trial judge gave him the right 
declaration of rights. 
Now, Ms. Miya, as you indicated when you were in 
court, the judge rattled off some things. I know that these 
defendants are frightened. I know that iu's very fearful for 
them and so I try and talk to them other than just reading a 
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Rule 11 dialogue. I try and talk to them. I try to look them 
in the eye and talk to them, but yet we can't really tell if 
he's got grounds for withdrawing the plea because I didn't 
advise him of some of the stuff. The only way I can do that is 
to go ahead and deny your motion and have you make a record on 
it, get a transcript and ask the appellate court about it. You 
know, I don't feel like I need to do that. 
On the other hand, I have a letter on the front of 
the file from Mr. Poundstone and he's whining about counsel and 
the fact that he couldn't communicate with you and you didn't 
do a very good job, et cetera, et cetera. That tells me that 
he really wants to delay this and he really wants to grab at 
any straw that's out there. I think this is the practice when 
people are put in the context of looking at a life sentence, 
they whine about their attorney. They are going to say the 
judge didn't do it right. They are going to say a lot of 
things. 
And I want to protect his rights, but your motion 
here has not told me specifically how this has prejudiced him. 
You're saying that plain error resulted in manifest injustice 
if the plea is left to stand without first informing defendant 
of all of the constitutional, statutory rights he was waiving 
at the hearing. I don't know what I said, but I'm usually 
pretty careful on this kind of a case to do it right, but 
that's not saying that I did. I can't remember. 
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You understand, Mr. Poundstone, if we set this plea 
aside, all of the charges in the Information will be reinstated 
and you'll have a jury trial? You understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that what you want to do? 
THE DEFENDANT: I believe that would be the best 
interest for me because --
THE COURT: And you're not going to be able to pick a 
lawyer? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: You've got Ms. Miya? 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that. And there's 
things that I looked at that my younger half brother during his 
interview said, and part of that as I went over it, there's 
part of the things that he's not saying and I realize that. 
Now I know, I mean, my younger brother is about a year younger 
than me and I know he's not very familiar with this stuff but. 
THE COURT: And you realize that there'll be greater 
risk if all of the charges are reinstated? You understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
MS. MIYA: And, your Honor, I had two other clients 
assigned to my caseload and Judge Payne's caseload that wrote 
essentially the same letter to Judge Payne asking to have me 
reassigned because I was incompetent and this is essentially 
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that same letter. Mr. Poundstone was in the same pod as these 
other two people. I wasn't allowed -- I mean, Judge Payne did 
not allow them to fire me, but because of subsequent 
conversations that the two people had, I was allowed to 
withdraw representation. I just at this point don't really 
feel like I can represent Mr. Poundstone properly at a trial if 
you allow his guilty plea to be withdrawn simply because of the 
people planning and -- the hearing that we had before Judge 
Payne, your Honor, basically Mr. Poundstone hasn't really said 
anything that's extremely horrible, but it sounds like from 
this letter that he doesn't have confidence that I can 
represent him properly and I just don't feel like that I'll be 
able to do an adequate job in his eyes no matter what happens. 
I just feel like I'm looking at either a malpractice 
suit or a bar complaint and I wouldn't ask -- I don't want to 
have that in my future, your Honor. 
MR. CHARLES: Your Honor, Ms. Miya already made a 
motion to withdraw in this case once which we talked about in 
chambers and it was denied, but I think that we're getting 
sidetracked here. The standard for the motion to withdraw the 
plea is knowing and voluntary. Mr. Poundstone confirmed 
himself more than once when the plea was being taken and Ms. 
Miya has cited it in her motion that he did understand. 
I don't think that the word voluntarily necessarily 
has to be used, but the Court asked him several times if he 
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understood that he didn't have to, explained to him what his 
other options were, and then asked him if he wanted to enter 
the plea and he said yes. So although the Court didn't 
specifically say are you doing it voluntarily, I think it's 
obvious that he was. 
And then on the knowing part, in the affidavit all of 
the elements are stated. The Court asked him if he had read 
that. In addition, he had been advised of the elements clear 
back from the initial appearance and so that had been covered 
more than once. And so I would just submit to the Court, once 
again, that there is no basis to withdraw the plea in this 
motion. 
THE COURT: I can't really rule on whether I gave him 
a good enough Rule 11 discussion without listening to the 
recording. 
MS. MIYA: I have a copy of it, your Honor, if you 
want to take it. 
THE COURT: Has it been transcribed? 
MS. MIYA: I just have the audio. I just listened to 
it myself. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'd like time to listen to that 
because maybe I didn't do a good job. If that's the case, 
we'll start over, but I'd like to listen to it before I rule. 
That's one of my obligations, although I always try, 
particularly on a 5, 6 or 6, 10 to 15 to life situation I 
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usually try to. I'm going to take this motion under advisement 
and I guess the sentencing until I've had a chance to review 
that. Hopefully I can do that later today if you'll leave it 
with my clerk, okay? 
MS. MIYA: Yes, your Honor. Your Honor, 
Mr. Poundstone, may he address the Court on the motion just --
I think that Mr. Poundstone would like to be heard and it may 
or may not have some bearing on your ruling. 
THE COURT: On the motion to withdraw his plea? 
MS. MIYA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. CHARLES: Your Honor, could we take that under 
advisement as well and hear it later. I think that we're 
getting sidetracked again here in that the knowing and 
voluntarily is the standard. I don't think it really matters 
at this point what he has to say. Additionally, the burden is 
on the defense here. The motion, I believe, fails to state an 
adequate basis. The Court is still offering to indulge them 
and double check himself which is not required, but then 
there's also case law stating that when the defendant signs the 
affidavit and acknowledges that he understands, that the Court 
doesn't even have to go through the Rule 11 colloquy on the 
record and there's no question that happened here. 
THE COURT: Well, that's never been my understanding 
to the law. What's the date of that case? 
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MR. CHARLES: Could we have some time to brief it? 
THE COURT: Sure. Yeah. 
MR. CHARLES: Do we just want to put this back on 
calendar in two weeks? 
THE COURT: I think that's what we should do. I'll 
listen to the dialogue and just give me some brief law then, 
Mr. Charles. 
MR. CHARLES: Okay. 
THE COURT: Ms. Miya's brief is here. I'll read it 
again. Let me consider this and I'll rule on it our next day 
here which will be November 3rd. 
MS. MIYA: And, your Honor, if this is going to serve 
as Mr. Charles' response to the motion, may I have at least a 
couple of days to look at it and review it and get an adequate 
basis for arguments? 
THE COURT: Sure. Sure. Yeah, let's try and get it 
done in two weeks, before two weeks. We won't even consider 
the matter of allowing you to withdraw yet. I'm starting to 
get letters from folks in the same blocks over there in the 
jail and I'm not paying a lot of attention to them. 
MS. MIYA: Is it a 1:30 hearing? 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MS. MIYA: Is that hearing 1:30? Thank you, your 
Honor. 
(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
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MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.) 
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THE COURT: Okay. On for sentencing is Brian 
Poundstone. 
MS. MIYA: And, your Honor, before we do sentencing 
on Mr. Poundstone, we still have to deal with his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
THE COURT: Yes, actually I don't know if we can 
resolve that today or not. I was waiting for a memoranda of 
brief. 
MS. MIYA: Right. Mr. Charles was going to 
(inaudible.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Charles, the way we left this was 
that you were going to prepare a brief to support your position 
on Ms. Miya's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
MR. CHARLES: That's correct. And the point that I 
was going to brief is whether or not the affidavit in support 
of guilty plea could satisfy the Rule 11 requirement. The way 
I started the research on that was just by rereading the rule 
and realized that the language I was looking for is in the rule 
itself where it says, These findings may be based on 
questioning of the defendant on the record or if used a written 
statement, reciting these factors after the Court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood and 
acknowledged the contents of the statement. 
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In Ms. Miya's motion on page 3 it states, The Court 
went on to verify defendant had read and understood the 
statement of defendant in support of guilty plea. And I 
believe that the Court would have a copy of the statement in 
support of guilty plea in the file. That was the only issue 
that I intended to brief. I didn't feel like it was necessary 
after rereading the rule. I thought I could just point the 
language out to the Court and would submit on that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Miya. 
MS. MIYA: Your Honor, the case law on the Rule 11 
colloquy, as you are painfully aware, is that it requires 
strict compliance with the rule, not just substantial 
compliance. You were going to listen to the audio of the 
hearing to make sure that you covered everything that was 
supposed to be covered properly. And, again, the Supreme Court 
of the State of (inaudible) has absolutely said that we're not 
going to set up a script that the trial judge has to go through 
to make sure there's strict compliance. 
I think that you're in a position through your 
questioning co determine whether or not the person you're 
speaking to understands what's happening to him. I listened to 
the hearing audio and I really think that, first of all, that 
you did -- I think you did a really good job on your colloquy. 
I think that you asked every question that needed to be asked. 
At the time Mr. Poundstone understood what was happening to 
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him. What he didn't understand, again, what his -- and, your 
Honor, if you'll recall, when we set the hearing to take 
Mr. Poundstone's guilty plea, it was in your chambers and you 
absolutely already agreed on the sentencing recommendations 
that Mr. Charles and I had agreed on which would be your 
imposing a 6 to life instead of the 10 or 15. 
And, again, Mr. Poundstone understood that he was not 
going to be sentenced to 10 to life or 15 to life, but he was 
going to get the six. But, once again, I didn't always every 
time I spoke with him say 6 to life, 6 to life. I always 
talked about the six years, but I didn't add the to life on 
there just knowing in my mind that it was 6 to life. And 
Mr. Poundstone really, really at the time did not understand 
that it was a 6 to life and not just a six year prison 
sentence. That's really the basis for the motion to have his 
guilty plea withdrawn. 
He was really under the understanding that it was a 
six year prison sentence and then he would be done. And he 
didn't really until he had a chance after everything was over 
to sit in his room and really study the paperwork and read all 
his papers and he thought he understood everything, but 
apparently he didn't and asked me to file a motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea on that point alone. 
THE COURT: It would be my practice to be very 
careful about those at the first appearance hearing. It would 
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be pretty unclear as to how someone given the first appearance 
hearing and the exposure of the sentences that were possible to 
go through a case like this for the time period he's gone 
through it talking to counsel, so on and so forth, that that 
really would be something that he would not understand. 
(Someone is shuffling papers in the microphone and 
the Judge cannot be heard.) 
I don't know if there is case law on the -- well, on 
the basis of what I have before me, Ms. Miya, I'm going to deny 
your motion. I think the guilty plea was given knowingly and 
that he was aware of it. We had spoken in chambers about him 
taking the six to life rather than the 10 to 15 to life. And 
for his Information, if he does what he's supposed to do and 
gets into the sex abuse counseling and is a good student and 
proceeds and follows all the rules, he might get out under six 
years. In fact, they have the authority to let him out sooner 
than that. It's up to him. 
The Board of Pardons, if they want, can let him out 
in two, but I'm not going to allow you to withdraw your plea so 
we need to set a sentencing date. 
MS. MIYA: And then that brings up, again, whether or 
not it would be appropriate for me to continue and be 
Mr. Poundstone's attorney at his sentencing when he's already 
indicated to the Court that he was --
THE COURT: I usually rely on counsel on that, Ms. 
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